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Introduction
The U.S. power grid is a complex networked system that serves more than 300 million people, comprises more than 475,000 miles of transmission lines, and is valued at over one trillion dollars 1 . The transition from the traditional power grid to the smart grid improves reliability, performance, and management by creating bidirectional communications to operate, monitor, and control the flow of power distribution and observational techniques. However, the implementation of the smart grid brings with it significant security vulnerabilities and challenges 1 . The grid is considered to be a prime target for cyberattacks and cyber terrorism as power disruptions can impact other dependent infrastructures, and have significant economic ramifications and industry downtime costs [1] [2] [3] [4] . Over the last two decades, there have been many incidents of cyberattacks on the power grid all over the world, such as the denial-of-service (DoS) attack on a German power utility in 2012 that shut down the power supply for five days, and the very recent Ukrainian grid cyberattack 5 . A recent study shows that a loss of only 9 substations out of over 55,000 substations in the US could lead to widespread power outage lasting over 18 months 6 . Not surprisingly, the increased threat to power grid security has amassed a lot of attention from the government, the energy industry, and consumers alike. With the advances in technology and connectivity, security of the power grid has shifted from just prevention of physical attacks against power plants and distribution centers to include prevention of cyberattacks against the software and hardware that keeps the smart grid stable and operational. Despite significant efforts of the research community, unfortunately, the power sector is not yet prepared for cyberattacks 2, [7] [8] [9] [10] .
The overwhelming evidence for the need of a power grid resilient to cyberattacks, increases the importance of developing experimental testbeds that are controllable, attackable, and observable. Cyber security research of the power grid has been primarily limited to simulation experiments because of inherent difficulties in replicating a power grid in a laboratory environment. Nevertheless, considerable efforts have been placed in developing experimental testbeds at academic institutions and federal laboratories; preparation of an exhaustive list of such facilities is beyond the scope of this work. Instead we mention two such works that we find somewhat unusual in scope, such as the GridGame and the Aurora Generator Test, both of which were developed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The Grid Game 11 is a simulation platform in which the user attempts to maintain a constant grid frequency by altering the parameters of a control system. While the user attempts to maintain the functionality of their grid, they must endure a series of cyberattacks launched by hackers. This type of platform is effective in gathering data on the tendencies of cyber criminals as well as witnessing the effects cyberattacks have on the grid. However, this platform lacks the ability to simulate any cyber-physical attacks and the functionality of implementing any control theoretic security algorithms.
The Aurora Generator Test at the INL was run in 2007 to show the effects of a possible cyberattack on physical components of the power grid. The simulated cyberattack used a program to rapidly open and close a diesel generator's circuit breakers to cause it to go out of phase from the rest of the grid culminating in an inoperable generator. This vulnerability has been referred to as the "Aurora Vulnerability" 12 . Even though this platform involved a real generator and explored the effects of taking a generator out of synchronism, it is not repeatable because the generator will be destroyed by the first experiment if performed correctly. The intent of this paper is to develop a platform capable of testing a multitude of cyberattacks and their effects on the microgrid testbed. Once fully developed and realized, the platform could be used to test control methods to prevent or withstand cyberattacks. This paper presents the development of an experimental platform for observing the effects of cyberattacks on a generator control system. The main hardware of the testbed is a LabVolt EMS8241-20 series synchronous generator which is equipped with a data acquisition system over an Ethernet link. The feedback loop is completed through the Ethernet link between the generator terminal voltage to the controller (implemented in a Laptop) and between the controller and the generator field coil. All aspects of the platform including the data acquisition unit, the transmission medium, and the controller are discussed in detail. A baseline for the behavior of the system is obtained by presenting the system under normal operating conditions. The functionality of the controller is demonstrated by altering the load supplied by the generator and observing the terminal voltage. We launch a series of false data injection attacks (biasing and random data) and record the actual terminal voltage of the generator as well as the terminal voltage of the generator perceived by the controller. Lastly, we launch a DoS attack by increasing the probability of packet loss in the network, modeled by an i.i.d. Bernoulli process. With no attack prevention mechanisms in place, the platform provides a facility to observe and evaluate the impacts of various cyberattacks on a real, physical power generator.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the development of the hardware platform using LabVolt EMS8001. This section also discusses data acquisition system and Ethernet interface for the developed testbed. Experimental results of cyberattacks on the generator control system are presented in Section 3, followed by concluding remarks in the Section 4.
Development of the Platform
The first step is to present the development of the hardware testbed for investigation of cyberattacks on a generator control system. Figure 1 shows the high-level view of the NCS testbed for closed-loop control of a synchronous generator. The generator supplies power to a load, and as the load changes, its terminal voltage changes. The generator terminal voltage is controlled by adjusting the field current using a controller. The feedback loop is completed through an Ethernet link for data transmission between the generator terminals to the controller, and between the controller and the field coil. This makes the closed loop system vulnerable to cyberattacks since a cyber intruder can easily initiate a data attack or a denial-of-service (DoS) attack in the generator control system. Figure 1 shows that schematic of the networked control system of the platform.
Figure 1 Closed Loop Generator NCS System
The experimental platform was developed using the LabVolt EMS8001 hardware system as shown in Figure 2 . The developed platform is based on a 200W, 4 pole synchronous generator which is driven by a dynamometer serving as the prime mover. The dynamometer has a separate control system that maintains its speed at 1800 rpm. The generator supplies switchable RLC loads through a transmission line. The field circuit of the generator is supplied by an IGBT controlled DC/DC chopper. The generator terminal voltage and current are measured using voltage and current transformers and appropriate electronic circuits. Further details of the platform and data interfaces are discussed below.
Figure 2 Hardware setup of the Experimental Platform

Data Acquisition System
The sensor data acquisition system (DAQ) is based on an Arduino Uno which has an Atmega328P MCU interfaced with a Wiznet w5500 TCP/IP stack. The Atmega328P MCU has a native, six channel analog-to-digital converter (ADC) that samples each of the channels in this experiment at 1000Hz. The serial peripheral interface (SPI) on the Atmega328P is used for relaying the current and voltage measurements through the network as the Atmega328P does not have network capabilities. Therefore, the w5500 chip, which is a hardware TCP/IP stack that communicates with the host MCU through SPI, is incorporated into the system. Additional circuitry is integrated to transform the voltages and currents into acceptable voltages for the 10 bit analog to digital converter (ADC) on the MCU. Figure 3 shows the block diagram of the sensor interface.
Figure 3 High Level Overview of the Data Acquisition System
The controller and DAQ system seen in Figures 2 and 4 respectively, are connected via an Ethernet link. A connection via Ethernet implies that the transmission medium is reserved for all network traffic, which makes it susceptible to congestion. The transport layer protocol implemented in our platform is UDP. A connection-based protocol that guarantees eventual packet delivery, such as TCP, is not suitable for this type of system. As discussed in 12 , a connection-based protocol introduces added network congestion due to retransmissions of the same data packet, and by the time the packet is received, it is often outdated from the perspective of the controller.
Figure 4 Data Acquisition Unit
The data acquisition (DAQ) unit seen in Figure 4 is created to measure two voltages and currents of a single phase for both the source and the load. The voltage is sensed using a stepdown voltage transformer stepped down to ±7.5Vpp and then to ±2.5Vpp using voltage divider. Since the Arduino is only equipped to handle positive voltage values of 0-5V, the sensed voltage is DC shifted to a range from ±2.5Vpp to 0-5Vpp with a summing Op Amp configuration. The current was sensed using a current transformer and the current's sensible range was fitted to the Arduino's specification in a similar manner.
The data packet transmitted from the DAQ to the controller contains twelve bytes of information. Encompassed in the twelve bytes are two instantaneous voltage measurements, two instantaneous current measurements, and a time stamp which corresponds to the time the generator terminal voltage is recorded. In practice, the data packet will contain RMS voltages and currents, but the clock frequency of the Atmega328P is not fast enough to compute the RMS voltages and currents while maintaining a sufficient sampling frequency. Therefore, all RMS computations are done on the computer running the control algorithm.
The control loop between the controller and the generator field is closed through the Ethernet link using an identical MCU setup. The control signal packets transmitted by the controller arrives at an Atmega328P local to the generator field winding. The field signal drives an IGBT that regulates the dc voltage applied to the generator field winding.
Generator Field Control
The induced electromotive force (EMF) of the generator is proportional to the field current which is controlled via an IGBT chopper circuit. A constant DC voltage, , is applied to the IGBT anode, and the output of the IGBT chopper circuit is proportional to the duty cycle, , so that the average DC voltage applied to the generator field coil is = .
Because of high inductance in the field winding, the actual field current of the generator is nearly a constant dc current with a small superimposed ripple at the IGBT switching frequency.
Figure 5 Voltage Controlled Excitation Diagram
The frequency of the output voltage is controlled by the speed of the prime mover. A separate control algorithm in the dynamometer is responsible for controlling the frequency of the generator voltage and is beyond the scope of this paper.
The PI (proportional-integral) controller shown in Figure 6 regulates the gate voltage applied to the IGBT. As seen in Figure 5 , the controller signal which is the duty cycle of a PWM signal produced by the Atmega328P, is applied to the gate of the IGBT. A limiter is implemented in software to ensure that duty cycle remains between 0.1 and 0.9 ( Figure 6 ) which ensures the safety of the IGBT and surrounding components. The generator field circuit is represented by the transfer function 1 ( + ⁄ ), where and are the resistance and inductance of the generator field coil, respectively. The induced EMF of the generator is proportional to the field current where the magnetic constant of the field coil is represented by . The generator stator circuit is represented by a series resistance and synchronous inductance. Figure 6 shows the complete block diagram of the control system.
Figure 6 Block Diagram of the Generator Control System
Various experiments were performed to identify the unknown parameters of the control block diagram in Figure 6 . These experiments are rather standard and can be found in textbooks on electric machines, and thus are omitted here for brevity. While generator magnetics is somewhat nonlinear, all experiments conducted in this research were at the mid voltage range which is below magnetic saturation. This provides a reasonably linear model of the complete control system except for the limiter of the duty cycle block. In this research, no attempt was made to include this nonlinearity in the control design; this will be the subject of future research. Nevertheless, the PI gains were designed to ensure that variations in the duty cycle remained within the bounds of the limiter block.
The forward transfer function of the (linear) system model identified by experiments is given by ( ) = 4630.6 ( + 15)( + 35) which was used to design the PI controller as given by
where the proportional gain = 0.005 and the integral gain = 0.1. Performance of the closed loop system was verified by simulations and additional experiments.
Experimental Results
In this section we analyze the effects of cyberattacks on the generator control system. As discussed earlier, the objective of this work is to present a platform for the analysis of cyberattacks on a physical generator control system; analysis of such cyberattacks on the generator control will be considered in future research.
Cyberattacks were implemented in the Ethernet data link between the generator voltage sensor and the controller. As the (simulated) intruder intercepts the sensor data, the actual data received by the controller was modified by adding an appropriate attack data. To facilitate actual cyberattacks, future research will include opening the data port to intruders (human subjects).
In this research, the following types of cyberattacks were considered:
•
Baseline Performance
First, we show the closed loop system performance running under various load conditions. The generator terminal voltage was set at 75V under no load condition. Then loads were switched ON at various time points. Figure 7 shows that, as different loads are switched on, the PI controller changes the IGBT duty cycle so as to maintain the constant terminal voltage.
Figure 7 Normal Operation with Load Switching
As the generator is loaded with resistive (Note 1 and 2 in Figure 7 ) or inductive load (Note 4 in Figure 7 ), the terminal voltage drops below the desired nominal voltage which prompts the PI controller to increase the duty cycle; this increases the generator induced EMF and a corresponding increase of the terminal voltage back to the desired value. During switching, a small transient follows in the generator terminal voltage as shown in Figure 7 , which settles in about 0.5 seconds. As the capacitive load (Note 3 in Figure 7 ) is switched ON, the generator terminal voltage increases above the desired voltage so that the controller reduces the IGBT duty cycle. Figure 8 shows a constant bias attack in which the intruder injects a constant bias to the generator voltage data packets. The controller believes it is maintaining the desired terminal voltage, while the consumer is getting a voltage that is different from the expected voltage.
Constant Bias Attack
Figure 8 Constant Bias Attack
As the intruder injects a bias in the sensor data, the generator terminal voltage increases so that the PI controller reduces the IGBT duty cycle. The controller maintains the IGBT duty cycle based on the (false) sensor data it receives so that there is a difference between the actual generator voltage and the false generator voltage. The difference between the two voltages is exactly equal to the bias induced by the attacker. In an actual power system, if the load voltage drops below a certain threshold, the circuit breaker trips the load.
Ramp Bias Attack
In Figure 9 , we consider a data attack in which the intruder injects a linearly increasing bias into the voltage data packets. For this experiment, it is assumed that the bias voltage increases according to the equation = !, i.e. 1 volt drop per second. Thus, as time increases, the bias data injected by the intruder also increases which leads the controller to correspondingly decrease the IGBT duty cycle. The controller falsely "believes" that the generator terminal voltage is being maintained at the desired constant level, while in fact it keeps on decreasing. In an industrial setting, the generator will be shut down by the under voltage relay. Figure 10 shows a random data injection attack in which the intruder adds a random number to the sensor data packets. In this attack however, is a uniform random number between -10V and 10V. This sets the controls into large variations in the duty cycle and the corresponding changes in the generator terminal voltage. Note again that while actual terminal voltage of the generator varies randomly, the controller has no way of knowing the actual scenario as the controller receives sensor data that has been manipulated by the attacker. 
Figure 9 Ramp Bias Attack
Random Data Injection
Denial-of-Service
Next we investigate the effects of the denial-of-service attack in the sensor data transmission. Data packets in transition from the sensor to the controller were dropped according to a Bernoulli process; the packet dropout probability was assumed to be 0.98. This research uses UDP protocol for data transmission so that a lost data packet is not retransmitted. Instead it was assumed that the controller holds the last received sensor data and uses it to replace the lost packet. Figure 11 shows noisy response of the generator due to Bernoulli packet drops. It has been shown that the closed loop system maintains stability in the mean square sense if the packet drop probability is below a certain threshold
Figure 11 DoS Attack
Conclusions
The development of an experimental platform for the purpose of observing and evaluating cyberattacks on a real physical generator is presented. An in-depth description of the experimental setup is provided along with a controller design suitable for normal operating conditions. This will help readers to develop similar experimental testbeds and conduct experiments on grid security. Although the developed testbed has only one generator, it can be easily extended to a multi-bus multi-generator testbed. The only requirement will be to include a synchronizing module for each generator, which is commercially available including one from LabVolt; it is essential that synchronous generators in a grid must be synchronized. False data injection and denial-of-service attacks were launched on the defenseless system to prove the functionality of the controller and the ability to successfully implement a cyberattack. The results demonstrate the impacts of cyberattacks on the generator and its stability conditions. The platform is used in our senior level course on power systems as a laboratory demonstration which shows the impacts of cyberattacks, albeit simulated, on a real physical generator.
Future research consists of extending the platform to observe and evaluate cyberattacks on a microgrid. Once fully developed, the platform can be used to evaluate cyber countermeasures capable of defending or preventing harms to the power grid. One of the future goals is to make the platform accessible to human subjects who will launch cyberattacks on the system. In particular, an emphasis will be placed on understanding and incorporating the human behavior component 13 of the adversary into understanding the grid security.
